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HOW THE LAW SHOULD VIEW
VOLUNTARY CHILD SOLDIERS:




“[W]ar is evil and should be ended; children are innocent
and should be protected.”1
CHILDREN’S participation in armed conflict has occurred for cen-turies. Children, those under the age of eighteen,2 fought in warsdating back to the Middle Ages; even “[t]he Civil War in the
United States was a war of boy soldiers.”3 What has occurred recently is
the international concern over the use of “child soldiers”4 in modern
armed conflicts, mostly due to the criminalization of the way in which
adults have recruited and used these children to violate the laws of war
and commit reprehensible atrocities.5 The international human rights
concern has aggregated the use of children in every armed conflict under
a strong discourse of victimization despite the important distinctions be-
tween the different types of conflicts in which children fight and the dif-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2016; B.A. in Anthroplogy,
Princeton University, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Turner for her helpful
comments in writing this comment. I would also like to thank my husband, Jack, for his
comments, edits, and constant support.
1. DAVID M. ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TER-
RORISM 1 (2005).
2. The use of the word “child” and “children” in this Comment will refer to those
eighteen and younger.
3. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 4–5.
4. For the purposes of this Comment, “child soldier” refers to anyone under the age
of eighteen fighting with an armed group. “Armed group,” in this Comment, is used ac-
cording to the manner in which it is used in international law: “Armed groups are made up
of individuals over whom the state on the territory of which they operate wishes to main-
tain special control thanks to its internal laws. As such, armed groups do not benefit from
the same status as government forces. In internal law, or in the language of the public
authorities, the members of armed groups simply refuse to obey the law; they are bandits
under ordinary law, terrorists, stateless persons who can be punished for the mere fact of
having taken up arms. In international law, no instrument places insurgents on an equal
footing with government troops. Armed groups therefore have relatively low status in in-
ternational law, when it applies.” Zakaria Dabone´, International Law: Armed Groups in a
State-Centric System, 93 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 395, 397 (2011).
5. MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLICY 27 (2012).
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ferent motivations prompting the children to fight.6 While child soldiers,
in varying types of conflicts and out of differing motives, have committed
grave atrocities, the prevalent discourse of victimization completely ex-
cuses criminal responsibility for those younger than eighteen.7 Criminal
law is designed to hold perpetrators accountable, in part to protect the
victims they have harmed. But because child soldiers are both perpetra-
tors and victims, due to their vulnerability and tender age, children’s
rights advocates and international law strongly advocate for complete
prosecutorial immunity.8
While a categorical approach that excuses all criminal responsibility for
children who engage in conflicts, like every categorical rule, is easily ap-
plied, a more nuanced look at the issue of why child soldiers fight would
better achieve justice. Despite what the international discourse about
child soldiers has become, children both are coerced into and volunteer
to join armed groups.9 However, the international community has erased
this distinction for purposes of criminal accountability: “[a]lthough prose-
cuting child soldiers . . . is certainly not unlawful, such prosecutions . . .
increasingly are seen as inappropriate and, even, illegitimate.”10 But in
order to pursue justice in the midst of, and in the wake of, armed con-
flicts, the “legal fiction”11 that assumes all child soldiers are alike must be
addressed.
The question of criminal responsibility for child soldiers has particular
salience regarding the War on Terror and the emerging threat of extrem-
ist groups, such as ISIS, who are actively recruiting juveniles.12 While not
all child terrorists are fighting voluntarily, the unique ideology that at-
tracts youth to volunteer to join terrorist organizations and the transna-
tional nature of terrorism implicate different notions of justice and
criminal responsibility, while also raising important questions about
which courts, domestic or international, are best suited to prosecute
crimes related to terrorism.13
6. See, e.g., U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, Child Recruitment, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/
effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/ (“Regardless of how children are re-
cruited and of their roles, child soldiers are victims, whose participation in conflict bears
serious implications for their physical and emotional well-being.”) (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 37, 62; MATTHEW HAPPOLD, The Age of Crimi-
nal Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNT-
ABILITY AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2006) (manuscript
at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934567.
8. See supra notes 5 and 6.
9. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 17; DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 62.
10. DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 18.
11. See id. at 19.
12. See, e.g., Gul Tuysuz & Ivan Watson, Missing UK girls believed to be in Syria,
police say, CNN (Feb. 24, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/24/europe/turkey-
uk-missing-girls/. The use of the word “terrorism” and “terror” in this Comment refers
specifically to the efforts of radical Muslim groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-
Qaeda.
13. See Jethro Mullen, What is ISIS’ appeal for young people?, CNN (Feb. 25, 2015,
2:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/; Kimiko De
Freytas-Tamura, Teenage Girl Leaves for ISIS, and Others Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
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Even though the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), partly due to
the international disapproval of prosecuting child soldiers, does not have
jurisdiction over those under the age of eighteen, should national criminal
justice systems and military commissions take a different approach?
While the ICC focuses on international and internal armed conflicts, ter-
rorism is a different crime, one that is transnational, but also localized in
many different countries due to the geographically diverse locations of
attacks and victims.14 There is a dearth in scholarship addressing this dif-
ference and the difference between an armed group’s use of voluntary
child soldiers for committing acts of terror from the use of the more pro-
totypical child soldiers15 in internal armed conflicts like those in Sierra
Leone and Rwanda.16 Should voluntary child soldiers participating in ter-
rorist activity be treated differently in terms of criminal responsibility?
This Comment argues that those who commit acts of terror voluntarily
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen should be prosecuted, but their
young age should merit special protections in their prosecutions. Further-
more, these prosecutions are best suited to domestic criminal justice sys-
tems, including military commissions, and not to the ICC or other
international tribunals. However, voluntary child soldiers of terrorism
should still be seen as both perpetrators and victims under the law; the
opaque line between the two categories should not be superficially clari-
fied due to the “voluntariness” of the crimes committed and the wide-
spread fear of growing terrorism. Until a proper, age-appropriate method
of prosecution for these child terrorists is accomplished, neither the chil-
dren nor the victims who suffer at their hands will see true justice.17
Part II of this Comment will provide a historical background on child
soldiers and explain the evolution of international and United States laws
relating to child soldiers. Part III will discuss the current legal issues re-
garding child soldiers, focusing on the unique dilemma posed by terror-
ism. Part IV will analyze what “voluntary” means, and at what age child
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/world/from-studious-teenager-to-isis-recruiter
.html?_r=0.
14. Farouk Chothia, Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?, BBC (May 4, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501 (Boko Haram); Holly Yan, Why is ISIS so
successful at luring Westerners?, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
10/07/world/isis-western-draw/ (Westerners joining ISIS); Kim Willsher, Seven weeks after
attack, Charlie Hebdo resumes regular publication, LA TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 11:08 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-charlie-hebdo-resumes-publication-20150225-
story.html (Charlie Hebdo attack).
15. The typical child soldier being an African child abducted and handed an AK-47.
See, e.g., Many South Sudan boys ‘kidnapped to be child soldiers’, BBC NEWS (March 1,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31681302.
16. The civil wars in these countries led to the creation of international and hybrid,
international and domestic, tribunals that all chose not to prosecute child soldiers. See
Linda Van Brakel, Minding the Impunity Gap: Child Soldiers, International Law and
Human Rights Policy 18, 38 (July 18, 2013) (unpublished L.L.M. Thesis, Utrecht Univer-
sity), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353009.
17. This Comment will not attempt to address what type of punishments, in particular,
are most appropriate for child terrorists, nor will it make an argument about which courts
within domestic systems, military or civilian, are best.
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soldiers of terrorism should be held accountable under the law. Part V
will give recommendations regarding how domestic criminal justice sys-
tems should treat voluntary child soldiers of terrorism.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CHILD SOLDIERS
A. WHO IS A CHILD SOLDIER?
UNICEF’s 1997 Cape Town Principles define a child soldier as “any
person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregu-
lar armed force or armed group in any capacity.”18 This widely accepted
definition does not distinguish between those who voluntarily enlist in
armed groups and those who are forcibly conscripted into armed groups.
The prototypical “child soldiers” live in a conflict zone and have been
forcibly taken from their family and threatened by leaders of whatever
group has abducted them to commit atrocities or face rape, torture, or
even death.19 Most of these child soldiers are teenagers, the average age
“being between twelve and thirteen years old.”20 This narrative does not
encompass the number of youth who are fleeing their homes to join ISIS
or other terror organizations, as many of these youth come from privi-
leged backgrounds, are well-educated, and do not reside in countries that
are war-torn.21 Even so, all those under eighteen fighting with armed
groups around the world are considered “child soldiers.”
There exists no completely accurate estimate of the current number of
child soldiers worldwide, but most agree there are as many as 300,000
children involved in an estimated thirty conflict zones around the world
who are considered child soldiers.22 Geographically speaking, much of
the current situation surrounding voluntary child soldiers is concentrated
in Africa and the Middle East. At least half of child soldiers worldwide
are in Africa, but the use of child soldiers occurs in “at least fourteen
other countries on four continents.”23
Child soldiers have a prominent presence in the Middle East.24 In Pal-
estine alone, it was estimated that seventy percent of the First Intifada
(uprising against Israeli authorities)25 was comprised of young teenag-
18. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 9.
19. Tessa Davis, Comment, Lost in Doctrine: Particular Social Group, Child Soldiers,
and the Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Exploited Children, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
653, 656–58  (2011).
20. Id.
21. See Tim Stanley, Isil’s Western converts are not motivated by Islam. They are moti-
vated by boredom, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep. 4, 2014), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tim-
stanley/100285161/isils-western-converts-are-not-motivated-by-islam-they-are-motivated-
by-boredom/.
22. Christopher L. Dore, Comment, What to Do with Omar Khadr? Putting A Child
Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2008).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Damien McElroy, Israel-Gaza conflict: What is an infitada?, THE TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 6, 2014, 7:25 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/109
90699/Israel-Gaza-conflict-What-is-an-intifada.html.
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ers.26 Child soldiers fought in the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and are
currently fighting with various terrorist organizations, including Al-
Qaeda and ISIS.27 A recent study suggests that eight thousand child
soldiers are currently associated with terrorist groups in the Middle
East.28
While children under the age of eighteen have long been fighting in
wars, “child soldiers” became an international human rights issue in the
1990s. Graca Machel’s 1996 report Impact of Armed Conflict on Children
“was one of the first [reports] to make the issue of child soldiers an inter-
national concern.”29 Now many NGOs, the U.N., the ICC, and even the
U.S. have made efforts to combat the use of child soldiers in armed con-
flicts.30 Further international attention spotlighted the problem when the
ICC tried its first defendant, Thomas Lubanga, who was convicted of con-
scripting children under the age of fifteen.31
Amidst this international discussion, the discourse has become one of
victimization, which makes the problem of voluntary child soldiers even
more difficult to address. “On the topic of child soldiers, the content of
transnational persuasive authority includes . . . faultless passive vic-
timhood.”32 As laws have developed over the past fifty years to hold
those who forcibly or voluntarily recruit child soldiers accountable, no
laws have clarified what to do with the child soldiers themselves—should
they be prosecuted, and if so, at what age? Laws regarding child soldiers
have failed to address these important issues and have only focused on
victimization, not the perpetration of crimes by these children. In the
name of advancing children’s rights, international criminal prosecutions
and laws have treated all child soldiers the same, never asking why they
are fighting.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS RELATING
TO CHILD SOLDIERS33
Until 1977 there were no laws directly addressing child soldiers, but as
public awareness of the use of child soldiers has expanded, so has the
26. Id.; see also ROSEN, supra note 1, at 91–92, 116 (explaining the prevalent use of
children in Palestine’s ongoing conflict with Israel).
27. See Dore, supra note 22 at 1294; Mullen, supra note 13.
28. P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 26 (2006).
29. Dani Cepernich, Comment, Fighting for Asylum: A Statutory Exception to Rele-
vant Bars for Former Child Soldiers, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2010).





31. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursu-
ant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http:// www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1379838.pdf.
32. DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 191.
33. Not every single law since 1977 related to child soldiers is included. See ROSEN,
supra note 1, at 139–46 (detailing a complete list of legislation regarding child soldiers).
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body of law.34 In 1977, “Additional Protocols” were added to the Geneva
Convention, which set the minimum age for the recruitment of children
in armed conflicts at fifteen.35 The Protocols also instructed that “[t]he
Parties to [a] conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that chil-
dren who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct
part in hostilities.”36
In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) articu-
lated a similar rule, asking countries to refrain from recruiting children
under the age of fifteen in armed conflicts, even though the CRC gener-
ally defined a child as anyone under the age of eighteen.37 In 2000, the
United Nations adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
(“Optional Protocol”), which was ratified by the United States in 2002,
and increased the age of recruitment of child soldiers to eighteen.38
Under the Optional Protocol, “All recruitment of child soldiers by non-
State armed groups is presumed to be involuntary, and thus illegal.”39
The Optional Protocol encourages State Parties40 to “take all feasible
measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not
attained the age of eighteen years do not take a direct part in hostili-
ties.”41 Since 2000, many countries, including the United States, have
taken efforts to prevent the forced recruitment of child soldiers and help
rehabilitate child soldiers back into society.42 Despite the laudable efforts
made by countries to combat the concerning issue of child soldiers, the
applicable laws fail to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary re-
cruitment and incorrectly presume that any recruitment under the age of
eighteen is involuntary, encouraging impunity for every child soldier.43
34. Steven Freeland, Mere Children or Weapons of War - Child Soldiers and Interna-
tional Law, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 19, 31 (2008).
35. Id. at 32.
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(1), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
37. Freeland, supra note 34, at 27.
38. Id. at 35.
39. Grantland Lyons, Comment, Separate but Equal Accountability: The Case of Omar
Khadr, 3 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 125, 137–38 (2013) (quoting
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict Annex I, art. 4, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49
(May 25, 2000)).
40. “A ‘State party’ to a treaty is a country that has ratified or acceded to that particu-
lar treaty, and is therefore legally bound by the provisions in the instrument.” Introduction
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Definition of key terms, UNICEF, http://
www.unicef.org/crc/files/Definitions.pdf.
41. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict Annex I, art. 1, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
54/49 (May 25, 2000).
42. Lyons, supra note 39, at 139 (“Specifically, the US noted that it contributed over
$10 million towards the demobilization of child soldiers and their reintegration in several
countries, including Afghanistan.”).
43. See DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting the clinical psychologist who testified in
Lubanga that a child can never be considered psychologically to have voluntarily joined an
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In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) became the first per-
manent international criminal tribunal to hear and decide cases involving
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.44 The Rome Statute
of 1998 formed the International Criminal Court,45 and the statute
designates the way in which the ICC can prosecute international crimes.46
Those involved in the drafting of the statute decided that criminal respon-
sibility for crimes under the subject matter jurisdiction of the court would
begin at age eighteen.47 The statute reads: “[t]he Court shall have no ju-
risdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the
alleged commission of a crime.”48 Even though the ICC does not have
jurisdiction of anyone under the age of eighteen, the Rome Statute only
makes the conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen a war
crime.49 This discrepancy and “gray zone” has left many wondering how
the law should view child soldiers between the ages of fifteen and eigh-
teen.50 If they can be legally recruited, why are they not held accountable
for the crimes they commit? Furthermore, the lack of jurisdiction, and
therefore criminal responsibility, for those under eighteen is not, as many
have claimed, a principle of the ICC and international law.51 Instead, the
drafters of the Rome Statute vigorously debated the appropriate age re-
strictions to the ICC’s jurisdiction and ultimately chose eighteen.52 While
the ICC has continued to bring attention to the important issue of the
illegal conscription of child soldiers,53 due to its jurisdictional limit, it has
failed to address the issue of voluntary child soldiers and how the law
should view those between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.
The latest international law that has continued the discourse of victimi-
zation is the 2007 Paris Principles.54 The Paris Principles state that
juveniles accused of committing international crimes involving armed
conflicts should be viewed “primarily as victims of offenses against inter-
armed group because if they could “we wouldn’t have a law that makes you 18 to become
an adult”).
44. Freeland, supra note 34, at 42, 44.
45. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 139.
46. Freeland, supra note 34, at 42–44.
47. See generally OTTO TRIFFTERER, ed., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 494
(1999).
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 26, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/
rome_statute_english.pdf.
49. Rome Statute art. 8.
50. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 142–45 (explaining the gray zone).
51. See HAPPOLD, supra note 7, at 6.
52. Id.
53. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber
Judgment, (March 14, 2012).
54. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Paris Principles: Principles and Guide-
lines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007 [here-
inafter Paris Principles], available at http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples3101
07English.pdf.
574 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
national law; not only as perpetrators.”55 Throughout these principles,
“[t]here is no mention of ending impunity for atrocities committed by
child soldiers, no matter their age or degree of voluntary participation . . .
”56 Not only has international law repeatedly evaded the question of
criminal responsibility for child soldiers, U.S. laws have also continued
the discourse of victimization, but have done so without ignoring the is-
sue of voluntariness.
C. U.S. LAWS REGARDING CHILD SOLDIERS
Many of the issues surrounding international legislation, the failure to
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary child soldiers, and the fail-
ure to address the gray zone of those fifteen to seventeen years of age,
are resolved by U.S. legislation regarding child soldiers. While the United
States has not become a State party to the ICC, it has enacted several
laws criminalizing the use of child soldiers.57 The Child Soldiers Account-
ability Act (“CSAA”) was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President George W. Bush in October of 2008.58 The CSAA confers
criminal responsibility on any person who “knowingly . . . recruits, enlists,
or conscripts a person to serve while such person is under 15 years of age
in an armed force or group; or . . . uses a person under 15 years of age to
participate actively in hostilities.”59
Although the CSAA defines a child soldier as any “person under 15
years of age,” another relevant piece of legislation, the Child Soldiers
Prevention Act (“CSPA”), an amendment to the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act, criminalizes the
use of child soldiers under the age of eighteen only when the children are
“compulsorily recruited” to participate in armed conflicts.60 The law con-
siders those who voluntarily join governmental armed forces to be unlaw-
ful child soldiers, meaning the leaders of the countries who recruit these
children face consequences only when the children are younger than fif-
teen.61 The CSPA prevents the U.S. from providing military assistance to
government forces that recruit child soldiers in violation of the law.62 The
CSPA clarifies the gray zone and is the only piece of legislation that cre-
ates a distinction between voluntary and involuntary child soldiers. While
these statutes are a step in the right direction, like the Rome Statute, they
55. Paris Principles, art. 3.6.
56. Brakel, supra note 16, at 28.
57. In addition to this legislation, the United States has “been a leading donor to the
effort to rehabilitate child soldiers.” Bryan Lonegan, Sinners or Saints: Child Soldiers and
the Persecutor Bar to Asylum After Negusie v. Holder, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 71, 74
(2011).
58. Cepernich, supra note 29, at 1112.
59. Child Soldiers Accountability Act §2(a)(1), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442 (West 2009).
60. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 22
U.S.C.A. § 2370c 2(A)(ii) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
61. Id. § 2370c 2(A)(iii).
62. Id. at § 2370c-1(a). But see generally Heather L. Carmody, The Child Soldiers Pre-
vention Act: How the Act’s Inadequacy Leaves the World’s Children Vulnerable, 43 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 233 (2012) (explaining the law’s inadequacy to protect child soldiers).
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only focus on the criminal responsibility of those recruiting child soldiers,
leaving an important question unanswered: how should the law view and
treat the child soldiers themselves?
III. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING
CHILD SOLDIERS
A. PERPETRATOR OR VICTIM?
The international and U.S. legislation represent the discourse of victim-
ization that has occurred regarding children fighting in armed conflicts.
“The dominant view in international law is that minors who have commit-
ted international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or
war crimes, are victims of the adults who recruited them and are not le-
gally culpable.”63 While children recruited, whether voluntarily or invol-
untarily, do face incomprehensible trauma, they are also “perpetrators of
some of the most violent crimes” in conflicts around the world.64
The categories of victim and perpetrator for child soldiers are not mu-
tually exclusive. In fact, child soldiers often oscillate between the two.
One child’s involvement in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone illustrates
the ambiguity well. A young girl forcibly conscripted by the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Counsel (“AFRC”) witnessed soldiers cut her
aunt’s newborn baby in half and burn her house down.65 She was then
taken to a camp and told to fight.66 She initially refused, but after being
involved in AFRC operations for some time, she and other child combat-
ants participated in the infamous invasion of Freetown and “cut off peo-
ple’s arms, heads, and breasts.”67 For many of these children, “self-
preservation can be mingled with an actual thirst for killing,” and they
can vacillate back and forth between shame and unspeakable violence.68
Despite the atrocities committed by these children, the international legal
consensus is that they are victims incapable of criminal culpability. “In
humanitarian accounts, child soldiers are either victims or demons, or,
better yet, they are demons because they are victims. Neither demons nor
victims are rational actors.”69
Certain children who join terrorist organizations experience a different
type of confusion of categories as they may join voluntarily, yet many in
the international community would see their choice as coerced simply
63. Pacifique Manirakiza, Les Enfants Face au Syste`me International de Justice: A´ la
Recherche d’un Mode´le de Justice Pe´nale Internationale Pour les De´linquants Mineurs, 34
QUEEN’S L.J. 719 (2009).
64. Lucia H. Seyfarth, Child Soldiers to War Criminals: Trauma and the Case for Per-
sonal Mitigation, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 124 (2013).
65. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 87.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see Michelle Staggs, Comment, Special Court Monitoring Program Update #45
Trial Chamber II - AFRC Trial Covering, Sierra Leone Trial Monitoring Program Weekly
Report, available at http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/SL-Reports/045.pdf (ex-
plaining Freetown Invasion).
68. Seyfarth, supra note 64, at 125.
69. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 134.
576 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
due to their age. In the past few months, a significant number of news
articles have lamented the number of Western youth fleeing their homes
to join ISIS.70 What will happen when these teenagers are apprehended?
Will they be prosecuted or seen as victims without any criminal responsi-
bility? Their stories seem quite different from the experience of a child in
Sierra Leone who was abducted and given an AK-47, yet laws have failed
to recognize this difference.71
The view of child soldiers primarily as, and maybe even only as, victims
is reflected in the lack of international prosecution of child soldiers for
the crimes they have committed even though no international law forbids
this type of prosecution.72 With one exception, international tribunals
have not prosecuted child soldiers.73 Furthermore, the only tribunal to
explicitly address the age of criminal responsibility and possibility of
prosecuting those under eighteen was the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“SCSL”), which was established after the bloody civil war that spanned
over ten years and involved thousands of child soldiers.74 The SCSL stat-
ute provides:
The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who
was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime. Should any person who was at the time of the alleged commis-
sion of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the
Court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth,
taking into account his or her young age and the desirability of pro-
moting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of
a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international
human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.75
Even though the court had formal jurisdiction over those fifteen and
older, international pressure led the Chief Prosecutor not to prosecute
anyone under the age of eighteen.76 “[I]nternational and national NGOs
responsible for child-care and rehabilitation programs in Sierra Leone
objected to any kind of judicial accountability for juveniles below eigh-
teen years for fear that such a process would place at risk the entire rec-
70. See, e.g., Terrence McCoy, How ISIS and other jihadists persuaded thousands of
Westerners to fight their war of extremism, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 17, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/17/how-isis-persuaded-thou
sands-of-westerners-to-fight-its-war-of-extremism/.
71. Not every child who fought in Sierra Leone was abducted, but the war was “nota-
bly brutal” due to the pervasive kidnapping practices of rebel leaders. See DRUMBL, supra
note 5, at 64.
72. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 91; DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 133.
73. This includes tribunals created after World War II (in both Nuremberg and Japan)
as well as the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International
Court Tribunal for Rwanda. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 18. The only exception occurred
in the hybrid tribunal set up in Timor-Leste, which charged a fourteen-year-old with crimes
against humanity. See DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 124.
74. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 33.
75. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, art. 7(1), Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145, available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.
76. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 42.
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onciliation and rehabilitation program.”77 The child soldiers were instead
encouraged, but not forced, to participate in Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions (“TRC”).78 Several scholars have pointed out the paradox
underlying this approach: “child soldiers are on the one hand supposedly
incapable of volunteering for military service, but on the other hand ca-
pable of volunteering to participate in TRC proceedings.”79
One way to explain the hesitancy in prosecuting child soldiers in Sierra
Leone was the brutal manner in which many of them were abducted,
raped, and drugged into military service.80 Although there were volun-
tary fighters, the victim/perpetrator divide was murky and the devastation
of the country extreme, so perhaps advocates of non-prosecution thought
the best way for the country to move forward was to encourage the rec-
onciliation of its fighting youth with the rest of the civilians through
TRCs. While Sierra Leone’s criminal tribunal followed other interna-
tional tribunals by not prosecuting child soldiers, the United States broke
the pattern of non-prosecution after the September 11th terrorist attacks.
The U.S. Military Commission at Guanta´namo charged Mohammed
Jawad and Omar Khadr with crimes committed in Afghanistan when they
both were under the age of eighteen.81 But these charges are definitely
the exception and not the rule.82 One possible explanation for the United
States’ decision is that the acts allegedly committed by Jawad and Khadr
did not occur in the wake of a brutal civil war, but instead were attacks on
American soldiers in a war between the United States and Afghanistan.
Therefore, the appeal of a TRC, like the one in Sierra Leone, was non-
existent as Jawad and Khadr had no need to reconcile with their fellow
countrymen in an attempt to move a war-ravaged country forward. Those
who have outspokenly opposed Khadr’s prosecutions, and many have,83
have ignored the specific context in which the prosecutions occurred.
77. Id. at 39–40.
78. Id. at  43, 51 (“The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established
in 2000 to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights
and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the
beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement; to address
impunity, to respond to the needs of victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.”).
79. Id. at 51; see also DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 184.
80. See DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 64.
81. Associated Press, Guanta´namo Detainee Released, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/world/asia/25gitmo.html?ref=topics (Mohammed
Jawad); Charlie Savage, Delays Keep Former Qaeda Child Soldier at Guantanamo, Despite
Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/us/delays-keep-
omar-khadr-at-guantanamo-despite-plea-deal.html (Omar Khadr).
82. Other exceptions have also existed in domestic courts. The government of the
Democratic Republic of Congo executed a fourteen-year-old child soldier in 2000. The
Congolose Court of Military Order sentenced four child soldiers between the ages of four-
teen and sixteen to death in 2001, but those sentences were not carried out. The Ugandan
government charged two former Lord’s Resistance Army fighters with treason when the
child soldiers were fourteen and sixteen; these charges were later withdrawn. See Matthew
Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 56, 71 (2008).
83. See, e.g., Warped Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
11/09/opinion/09tue1.html (referring to Khadr’s detention as a “disturbing case”).
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B. THE WAR ON TERROR
After the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, Con-
gress authorized President Bush to commence the War on Terror by using
“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States.”84 The War on Terror has in-
volved the use of many child soldiers. “Iraqi youth . . . participated in the
2003 conflict against the United States and its allies. In post-Saddam Iraq,
children have engaged in suicide bombing. Child soldiers have fought,
killed, and died in Afghanistan through successive conflicts.”85 Currently,
not only are children from the Middle East recruited into terrorism, many
youth in the West have joined terrorist organizations.86
As part of the War on Terror, the U.S. Military Commission at Guanta´-
namo Bay began detaining and trying suspects.87 Practices at Guanta´-
namo Bay have received harsh criticism, one criticism being the detention
and trial of Omar Khadr.88 Scholars have debated the detainment and
trial of Omar Khadr by the U.S. Military because Khadr was subjected to
harsh treatment at Guanta´namo Bay starting at the young age of
fifteen.89
From the age of ten, Khadr held close ties with Osama Bin Laden and
senior members of Al-Qaeda.90 Khadr’s family even made annual visits
to Osama Bin Laden’s home.91 Even though Khadr was a Canadian citi-
zen, his family moved frequently, visiting Al-Qaeda training camps.
Khadr then joined Al-Qaeda, and when he was fifteen years old, he “en-
gaged in a firefight with U.S. forces, [and] threw a grenade, killing Ser-
geant First Class Christopher Speer.”92
The international community, including many Americans, vehemently
opposed Khadr’s treatment at Guanta´namo.93 The U.S. Military classified
Khadr as an enemy combatant, a perpetrator of war crimes, and not as a
child soldier, a victim.94 Many have argued, “because of his age and [the]
circumstances surrounding the alleged offenses, Khadr should have been
84. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http:// www.law.cornell.edu/back-
ground/warpower/sj23.pdf.
85. DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 31.
86. Holly Yan, Why is ISIS so successful at luring Westerners?, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:01
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/world/isis-western-draw/.
87. Guanta´namo Bay Timeline, JURIST, available at http://jurist.org/timelines/2012/01/
guantanamo-bay-timeline.php.
88. See Four Days in Guantanamo, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.aljazeera
.com/programmes/witness/2012/01/20121121051543501.html (discussing the documentary
produced to examine “one of the most controversial detention facilities in the world”).
89. Freeland, supra note 34, 21–22.
90. Lyons, supra note 39, at 129.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 83.
94. Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (2008).
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classified as a child soldier.”95 Aside from Khadr’s status as an enemy
combatant, the legal issues arising from his “youth span[ned] many con-
texts, raising judicial questions regarding the legality of his detention, his
treatment and separation from adults while detained, jurisdiction to pros-
ecute him for war crimes, and the inadmissibility of his statements based
on his youth.”96 Despite these concerns, Khadr was kept at Guanta´namo
Bay until he was twenty-four, spending a third of his life there.97 He ulti-
mately pled guilty to murder and attempted murder in violation of the
laws of war, along with other less serious crimes, accepting a sentence of
eight years.98
Embedded in the public outcry against Khadr’s detention and trial was
the discourse of victimization.99 An important challenge to this discourse
is whether all child soldiers should be treated the same for purposes of
criminal punishment—should voluntariness matter? Khadr argued,
“[C]hildren can’t be expected to understand the law of armed conflict.
The laws of war require a degree of maturity and sophistication that chil-
dren simply cannot be expected to have.”100 Khadr’s attorneys invoked
the same general categorization of all child soldiers that international
human rights advocates do—all children are incapable of voluntarily par-
ticipating in armed conflict because they cannot comprehend the laws of
war. This argument implies that children should not be prosecuted for
their participation in armed conflict because they do not have an under-
standing of what they are doing.
However, evidence at the trial showed Khadr “considered himself an
active member of Al- Qaeda and shared its goals of killing all Ameri-
cans.”101 Khadr further articulated that “the proudest moment of his life
was constructing and planting land mines; he did so voluntarily and was
not forced to participate.”102 During the four-hour firefight that pro-
ceeded Khadr’s throwing the grenade, “Khadr had the opportunity to
leave . . . and understood he would not face any repercussions for doing
so, but [he] chose to stay and fight. He and the others made a pact to die
fighting rather than be captured by U.S. forces.”103 While children’s
rights advocates and legal scholars wanted Khadr classified as a child sol-
dier so that he would receive prosecutorial immunity, it is difficult to say
95. See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 39, at 130.
96. Richard J. Wilson, Omar Khadr: Domestic and International Litigation Strategies
for A Child in Armed Conflict Held at Guanta´namo, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 29, 33–34
(2012).
97. Id. at 70.
98. Id. at 73.
99. See, e.g., Andrea Prasow, The Child Soldier on Trial at Guanta´namo, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/27/child-soldier-trial-
guantanmo.
100. United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 223 (Apr. 30, 2008) (Ruling on Defense Motion for
Dismissal Due to Lack of Jurisdiction Under the MCA in Regard to Juvenile Crimes of a
Child Soldier), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080430Motion.pdf.
101. Brakel, supra note 16, at 83.
102. Id. at 84.
103. Id.
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Khadr’s choices were involuntary to merit such immunity. Nor were the
circumstances surrounding Khadr’s actions like those every other child
soldier experiences. Without defending Khadr’s long-term detention and
the nature of that detention,104 the decision to prosecute Khadr repre-
sented a more nuanced approach to the problem of voluntary child
soldiers.
C. WHY TERRORISM IS DIFFERENT
Whether and how to prosecute voluntary child terrorists is a question
still needing an answer today as ISIS’ expanding conquests include
recruiting many Western teenagers under the age of eighteen. What will
happen if these teenagers are apprehended? Will they be categorized as
victims and receive prosecutorial immunity? Very little scholarship has
discussed the difference between the prototypical child soldier and child
soldiers involved in terrorism. Even scholars who have said child soldiers
have the capacity to fight voluntarily have failed to account for the differ-
ences between child soldiers in civil wars, such as the internal armed con-
flict in Sierra Leone, and child soldiers joining terrorist organizations.105
Treating teenagers joining ISIS just like the teenagers who fought in
Sierra Leone not only dilutes the suffering and trauma experienced by
those in Sierra Leone, it creates an artificial category that includes all
children worldwide who participate in conflict, claiming they do so in the
same manner and for the same reasons. “[I]t is simply easier for interna-
tionalists to view the problem as one of abduction or unstoppable coer-
cion, instead of one that involves a mix of compelled participants and
participants who exercise . . . initiative.”106 A teenager voluntarily joining
ISIS is not the same as a teenager who is abducted and forced to kill
others. No two child soldiers are alike, but those involved with terrorism
create a distinct legal dilemma because terrorism affects countries differ-
ently than other traditional wartime crimes.
Because of the nature of terrorist attacks, the prosecution of those
committing the attacks is better suited to domestic courts, including mili-
tary tribunals, and not to international courts. After the civil war in Sierra
Leone ended, it was necessary to establish a hybrid tribunal, one involv-
ing international and domestic resources and law, to bring about justice in
light of the widespread devastation caused by over ten years of ruthless
fighting.107 In contrast, acts of terror are usually more sporadic and lo-
cated in geographically diverse places. Take, for example, the recent at-
104. Khadr’s detention was anything but just. “It ran afoul of good faith, given the
dilatory nature of the process. Military commission procedural rules fell short of appropri-
ate due process standards. Khadr’s prosecution inflicted gratuitous punishment, namely
lengthy pre-trial detention. It also subjected him to great evils, notably, distressing custo-
dial treatment and extraction of confessions through threats of gang rape.” DRUMBL, supra
note 5, at 212.
105. See generally ROSEN, supra note 1; DRUMBL, supra note 5.
106. DRUMBL, supra note 5, at 213.
107. Brakel, supra note 16, at 31–33.
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tacks in Paris at Charlie Hebdo by terrorists associated with Al-Qaeda.108
France is not ravaged by civil war and therefore unable to prosecute the
perpetrators of the attack; the criminal justice system in France is capable
of achieving justice.
Furthermore, due to the extent of the war’s destruction in Sierra Le-
one, there was no conceivable way to prosecute every perpetrator. The
hybrid tribunal decided only to prosecute those most responsible for the
grave crimes committed, which excused child soldiers from criminal re-
sponsibility.109 In situations like the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo or
the September 11th attacks in the United States, the lack of countrywide
death and destruction eliminates the need to focus only on prosecuting
the most egregious offenders, making the prosecutions of voluntary child
soldiers who assist in committing these types of attacks possible.
Additionally, Sierra Leone’s decision to achieve justice for the atroci-
ties committed by child soldiers through TRCs is inapplicable to situa-
tions of terrorism. Those under eighteen travelling to join ISIS and other
terrorist organizations do not need to make peace with their neighbors
once they are apprehended. Their crimes are not centralized in their own
communities, rendering the reasons TRCs were preferred for juveniles in
Sierra Leone, and other countries, irrelevant.110
The ICC is also not a suitable place for these prosecutions as the ICC
only intervenes to prosecute when a domestic court is unwilling or unable
to carry out justice after a particular conflict.111 As explained above,
many of the countries terrorized have the means to carry out prosecu-
tions of voluntary child terrorists. The need for ICC intervention or the
creation of international tribunals usually arises when a country is incapa-
ble of prosecuting all of the perpetrators because of reasons that also
suggest prosecuting juveniles is not the best way to administer justice.
Without these rationales, the inability to prosecute perpetrators due to
the devastation of war or the unwillingness to prosecute juveniles because
of the high volume of adult offenders, the categorical approach towards
abdicating criminal responsibility for all child soldiers is untenable. If ter-
rorism is in fact different, and there is a greater justification for juvenile
prosecutions, at what age should voluntary child terrorists be held
accountable?
D. AGE IS MORE THAN JUST A NUMBER
Aside from the U.S.’s prosecution of Khadr, child soldiers, even volun-
tary ones, are not prosecuted because of the prevalent understanding that
due to their young age, children are incapable of making rational and
108. Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2015, 12:55 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237.
109. Brakel, supra note 16, at 42.
110. See id. at 61.
111. Understanding the International Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-cpi
.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf.
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intentional decisions meriting criminal liability.112 Even if laws should
hold child soldiers accountable, the age at which they should be held
criminally responsible is strongly contested. There is no law besides the
SCSL statute, which allowed for the prosecution of those fifteen and
older, that articulates an appropriate age for criminal responsibility for
child soldiers. The debate is further complicated by the distinction be-
tween the voluntary and forced recruitment of child soldiers.
IV. VOLUNTARINESS AND AGE
Critical questions concerning child soldiers, particularly voluntary child
soldiers, need to be answered in order for domestic courts to pursue jus-
tice following terrorist attacks. In light of the many young men and wo-
men voluntarily joining extremist groups, the current laws and discourse
of victimization must be updated. The following questions need to be an-
swered to ensure domestic prosecutions of young terrorists are done in a
fair and just manner: What is voluntariness? At what age can a child sol-
dier voluntarily fight in an armed conflict, and more importantly, at what
age should voluntariness result in prosecution?
A. VOLUNTARINESS
Some have argued that no child soldier legitimately volunteers to fight
in armed conflicts.113
[I]n most cases the use of the term “volunteer” is a complete misno-
mer. It is usually the case that extreme circumstances [like] hunger,
poverty, abandonment, the death of parents and family, disease and
the lack of even basic medical services or the threat of violence or
property confiscation—will leave a child (or his/her parents) little
choice but to offer his/her services to a “cause.”114
Even the Special Representative in the Lubanga case, the ICC’s first
conviction, said “[t]he line between voluntary and forced recruitment is
therefore not only legally irrelevant but practically superficial in the con-
text of children in armed conflict.”115 Maybe the distinction is difficult to
make, but that does not render it “legally irrelevant.” The distinction
matters because without an articulation of the legal difference between
forcible conscription and voluntary recruitment, full justice cannot be
brought to the victims who suffer greatly at the hands of child soldiers
and their leaders. Moreover, the purpose of criminal law is accountability.
The only way to choose who is held accountable under the law is to know
who is criminally responsible—defining voluntariness makes that deter-
mination possible.
112. See HAPPOLD, supra note 7, at 11.
113. See, e.g., Freeland, supra note 34, at 27–28.
114. Id.
115. Noe¨lle Que´nivet, The Liberal Discourse and the “New Wars” of/on Children, 38
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1053, 1076 (2013) (quoting Lubanga).
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Voluntariness can be defined using legal norms and rules in other con-
texts. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has articulated that
voluntariness can be looked at through a totality of the circumstances
lens.116 When deciding whether consent to a Fourth Amendment search
is voluntary or not, the Court has stated:
In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in
fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of
subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents. Those searches that are
the product of police coercion can thus be filtered out without under-
mining the continuing validity of consent searches.117
The same analogy can be applied to the recruitment of child soldiers.
Judges can look at the totality of the circumstances, including an assess-
ment of coercive forces by recruiters and leaders of terrorist organiza-
tions (instead of the police), to determine voluntariness without simply
deciding that juveniles can never make voluntary decisions to fight in
armed conflicts (this process filters out cases of coercion so that “volun-
tary” still has meaning). At a certain age, voluntariness is not impossible
to assess, and courts can look to the circumstances under which children
decide to join armed conflicts to determine whether they legitimately vol-
unteered to join.
One scholar has argued that voluntariness can be assessed using two
factors: “whether a child appreciates the consequences of his/her decision
and whether there are viable alternatives to joining the armed forces or
groups.”118 While looking at psychology research can help judges and
lawmakers assess the first factor, using the second factor would virtually
eliminate all criminal responsibility for children and adults alike. Assess-
ing what a viable alternative is would cause more confusion than clarity,
and while domestic and international laws may be broken out of despera-
tion, that desperation does not excuse the wrongful act or negate the
need for punishment. Who would determine viability—a judge, the child,
a member of the community facing similar pressures in a similar
environment?
Assuming the first factor, whether children appreciate the conse-
quences of their decisions, is a viable metric of voluntariness, legislatures
must decide when children can do so. Obviously no two children are alike
in maturity, and anywhere one draws the line will seem arbitrary. But the
law requires line drawing, and that line drawing is most fair regarding
crimes related to terrorism when it comports with international under-
standings of child psychology. While cultures regard adult responsibility
differently, there are universal norms about juvenile development that
can help legislatures and judges formally decide at what age children
116. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
117. Id. at 229.
118. Que´nivet, supra note 115, at 1072.
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should be held accountable for voluntarily making the choice to fight in
an armed conflict.
Furthermore, laws within the U.S. outside of the criminal context rec-
ognize that juveniles should have autonomy in decision-making. Those
under eighteen can give consent for certain medical procedures, including
having an abortion.119 To claim that minors can never voluntarily consent
to fighting in armed conflicts means they are also incapable of giving
valid consent to any medical decisions that have long-term conse-
quences.120 Children’s rights advocates who claim all child soldiers are
victims who cannot voluntarily make a decision to fight also claim that
children have the right to self-expression and self-determination.121 Chil-
dren cannot be capable of both making serious medical decisions and
self-expression and yet completely incapable of making the decision to
join a terrorist organization. The question should not be whether a juve-
nile can make a voluntary decision to fight, but at what age should crimi-
nal responsibility begin in light of the child’s legitimate, voluntary choice.
B. AT WHAT AGE CAN A CHILD MAKE A VOLUNTARY DECISION?
Any age cutoff for criminal responsibility will seem arbitrary. However,
deciding each child’s culpability on a case-by-case basis is too arduous a
task for the courts to perform. Furthermore, not having a categorical rule
will frustrate deterrence objectives as those children who voluntarily join
armed conflicts will know they can always argue their situation does not
merit prosecution based on their particular circumstances. Instead of try-
ing to rationalize an appropriate age of culpability based on international
norms concerning the transition from childhood to adulthood, the law
should look at the lines already drawn in criminal statutes and at scien-
tific research that focuses on the ability of juveniles to make informed
choices, all of which point to fifteen as an appropriate age for criminal
responsibility.
While there is no international consensus about when a child reaches
adulthood,122 there are ways to quantify moral culpability. The age at
which children enter adulthood is inconsistent across countries, but the
age at which children should incur criminal responsibility poses a differ-
ent question; it is not just a cultural inquiry. When asking whether we
119. See Parental Consent and Notification Laws, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www
.plannedparenthood.org/health-info/abortion/parental-consent-notification-laws (listing
state laws relating to whether parental consent is necessary for obtaining an abortion and
explaining that even in states where parental consent is required, the minor can petition for
“judicial bypass” of this requirement).
120. See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 159 (2009).
121. Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 11-14, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.
122. “Americans let sixteen-years-olds drive, but not drink, and the Dutch let their six-
teen-year-olds drink, but not drive.” David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying
and Punishing Juveniles As Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 71, n.96 (2013).
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should prosecute those under the age of eighteen, we are not asking
whether they are as morally culpable or personally responsible as adults,
but whether they are morally culpable or personally responsible enough
to be punished for their actions.123
The age most often referenced in the U.S. and international laws re-
garding criminal responsibility and child soldiers is fifteen. The ICC has
jurisdiction over those eighteen and older, but the crime of conscription
only applies to those who recruit children fifteen and younger.124 The
Special Court of Sierra Leone, in the wake of the gruesome civil war,
included children fifteen to eighteen in the court’s jurisdiction.125 The
CSPA, enacted by the U.S. legislature, considers those who voluntarily
join governmental armed forces to be unlawful child soldiers, in the sense
that they are victims, only when they are younger than fifteen. Although
the law does not address the possibility of prosecuting voluntary child
soldiers fifteen and older, it at least recognizes the reality that fifteen-
year-olds are capable of making the decision to fight in armed conflicts.
Perhaps those who tried Omar Khadr in Guantanamo Bay had this stat-
ute in mind when they pursued his prosecution. The CSPA, Rome Stat-
ute, and SCSL statute provide a defensible justification for using fifteen
as the age at which voluntary child soldiers should be prosecuted.
The age of fifteen is also supported by psychology research, which has
shown that by fifteen, young men and women are capable of making deci-
sions and realizing the consequences of those decisions.126 One study
found that by age 14 or 15 reasoning capacities “roughly reach adult
levels.”127 Another study found that past the age of fourteen, adolescents
of at least average intelligence are capable of giving knowing and volun-
tary consent as it relates to decision-making.128 “Fifteen, sixteen, and sev-
enteen-year-olds, the age groups that commit most juvenile crime, are
much closer to adults than pre-adolescents on the traditional measures of
criminal desert.”129 It is important that those fifteen and older who volun-
tarily join armed conflicts are prosecuted because, from a psychological
perspective, fifteen year olds are capable of forming the requisite mens
rea to be found guilty of their crimes.
The voices calling for accountability of child soldiers are few, but the
123. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 599 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
124. See DRUMBL, supra note 5 and accompanying text; Freeland, supra note 34, at
42–44 and accompanying text.
125. Freeland, supra note 34, at 52.
126. See, e.g., Praveen Kambam, M.D. & Christopher Thompson, M.D., The Develop-
ment of Decision-Making Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neu-
rological Perspectives and Their Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES AND THE LAW 173 (2009).
127. Id. at 175.
128. Carrie S. Fried & N. Dickson Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Develop-
ment of Adolescent Judgment, Criminal Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 LAW AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 45, 46 (2001).
129. Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
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many who argue against it exclude discussions about mens rea.130 “To be
guilty of a crime, particularly with regard to serious offences, it is not
enough simply to have done a particular prohibited act; there must be the
requisite mens rea (guilty mind) as well as the actus reus (wrongful
act).”131 In order to justify the non-prosecution of child soldiers, it would
have to be shown that all children lack “a guilty mind.”132 Most scholars
argue that children lack the mental capacity to fully appreciate their
choices, and thus should be given leniency.133 But what the law requires is
different—mens rea is “a guilty mind,” not a mind capable of understand-
ing the full effect of each decision as an adult would.
Some examples of the horrific acts committed by children provide suf-
ficient evidence of their mens rea. One sixteen-year-old member of the
RUF described his involvement in Sierra Leone’s civil war this way:
My men knew I had to drink human blood every morning. If we had
a prisoner, I would kill him myself. I would cut off his head with a
machete . . . if one of the boys tried to escape and was caught, my
fighters would murder him themselves, because they knew it would
[be] even worse if they brought him to me.134
The way in which many child soldiers interviewed by anthropologists
describe their crimes reveals they knew what they were doing and what
the result of their actions would be.135 Omar Khadr made similar com-
ments.136 When Khadr became angry with his guards, “he recalled killing
the [American] soldier” and said “it made him feel good.”137 While some
child soldiers can describe their killings with chilling accuracy, should
their age still be a defense to having the requisite mens rea necessary for
prosecution?
While the infancy doctrine is a defense to mens rea, that doctrine, in
the United States, provides a presumption of a lack of mens rea only for
130. Even if the discussion is not entirely excluded, it is presumed that children are
never capable of having the requisite mens rea for international crimes. HAPPOLD, supra
note 7, at 2 (“It has been argued that international crimes have such onerous mens rea
requirements that children will always lack capacity to commit them.”)
131. HAPPOLD, supra note 7, at 71–72.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Sara A. Ward, Comment, Criminalizing the Victim: Why the Legal Com-
munity Must Fight to Ensure That Child Soldier Victims Are Not Prosecuted As War
Criminals, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 833 (2012) (“Because their judgment, cognitive
abilities, and impulse control mechanisms are still being developed, juveniles are less able
than adults to control their impulses, to use reason to guide their behavior, and to think
through the consequences of their actions.”).
134. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 60–61.
135. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 17 (“The relatively few published interviews with cur-
rent and former child soldiers carried out by anthropologists in the field make plain that
the experience of children at war has scant connection with the depictions in the humanita-
rian literature. [ ] [I]nterviews with male and female child soldiers . . . show that ‘many
under-age combatants choose to fight with their eyes open, and defend their choice, some-
times proudly.’”).
136. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 85.
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adolescents up to the age of fourteen,138 further confirming that fifteen is
an appropriate age at which to hold voluntary child soldiers accountable.
Like other international standards and psychology research show, the age
of fifteen is a time when youth can better appreciate their actions and act
from a guilty mind. “It cannot be presumed that children, particularly
those closer to eighteen, who voluntarily join armed forces, do not under-
stand their actions or the consequences of their decisions.”139 If older
youth who voluntarily commit international crimes are not seen as having
the requisite mens rea, justice cannot be seen for the victims of these
children’s voluntary choices.
However, just because adolescents are capable of making voluntary
and informed decisions does not mean they fully appreciate the conse-
quences of those decisions; therefore, those prosecuted between the ages
of fifteen and eighteen should be afforded special protections. To that
end, the U.S. (and other national court systems) should formally declare
jurisdiction over those fifteen and older who voluntarily join armed
groups involved in terrorism. This would clear up the confusion surround-
ing voluntary child soldiers between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. Fur-
thermore, formally declaring jurisdiction would keep countries
accountable to prosecuting in a way that comports with notions of juve-
nile justice instead of prosecuting on an ad-hoc basis as happened in the
case of Khadr. Without the recognition of both criminal responsibility
and special juvenile protections, countries like the U.S. will continue to
treat detainees like Omar Khadr as an adult without sufficient protec-
tions, and children’s rights advocates will continue to advocate for
prosecutorial immunity for teenagers who have voluntarily committed
atrocities.
V. HOW COURTS SHOULD RESPOND: PROTECTIONS
AND SAFEGUARDS
While the U.S. Military should have prosecuted Omar Khadr, he
should not have been treated the same as every other Guanta´namo pris-
oner. The law can hold children accountable without violating children’s
rights by protecting their immaturity and sensitivity. In the wake of the
controversy surrounding Omar Khadr’s detention and trial, it was discov-
ered that boys as young as ten and twelve were detained at Guanta´namo
in the same space as much older adult men.140 Only after media attention
surrounding this injustice were the young boys transferred to a separate
138. See Lara A. Bazelon, Comment, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy
Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 159–61
(2000).
139. Erin Lafayette, Comment, The Prosecution of Child Soldiers: Balancing Accounta-
bility with Justice, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 297, 311 (2013).
140. Richard J. Wilson, Children in Armed Conflict: The Detention of Children at Guan-
tanamo Bay, and the Trial for War Crimes by Military Commission of Omar Khadr, a
Child, 5 (Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-13) (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368323.
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facility.141 The discourse surrounding the victimization of child soldiers,
whether voluntary or not, has caused many to argue in favor of complete
immunity from prosecution, when in reality justice requires criminal re-
sponsibility and accountability, but accountability that is age appropriate.
The U.S. juvenile justice system already affords protections for
juveniles; it is presumed that juveniles are not as morally culpable as
adults, but the juveniles are not excused from criminal responsibility alto-
gether.142 The juvenile justice system in the United States has set up flexi-
ble ways for youth to be punished, but also rehabilitated, through
community service programs and placement at treatment-based facili-
ties.143 While the juvenile justice systems in states across the U.S. are far
from perfect, the effective programs that do exist can be used for volun-
tary child terrorists. This type of prosecution that is age appropriate bet-
ter achieves the criminal justice goals of retribution and rehabilitation as
perpetrators would not go unpunished, but they would also be treated in
a way that promotes their reintegration into society.
Studies have shown that youth are more capable of changing their ways
and reintegrating into society than adults are.144 In fact, one of the rea-
sons the United States Supreme Court raised the age of those convicted
of murder who qualify for the death penalty to eighteen was because “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The per-
sonality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”145
Even with an understanding that juveniles are different from adults,
their treatment within the U.S. criminal justice system can take several
different forms. Juveniles can be adjudicated in juvenile court, tried and
sentenced in adult courts for especially egregious crimes, or tried in mili-
tary commissions if the juvenile falls within courts-martial jurisdiction.146
Voluntary child soldiers should always receive special protections no mat-
ter in which court they are tried because of their susceptibility and vul-
nerability, which make recruitment to groups like ISIS frighteningly
easy.147
While military commissions do not have the same juvenile protections
as domestic courts, after Khadr’s case, and most likely due to the concern
so many expressed for Khadr’s well-being, changes were made regarding
Khadr’s detention.148 A significant reason so many human rights groups
141. Id.
142. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 63.
143. R. Daniel Okonkwo & Dylan Nicole De Kervor, There Are Two Sides to Every
Story: Collaboration Between Advocates and Defenders in Achieving Systemic Juvenile Jus-
tice Reform, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 435, 451 (2012).
144. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
145. Id.
146. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 70, 77 n.423, 80 (explaining that juveniles may be
tried as adults for egregious crimes and explaining why Khadr was under courts-martial
jurisdiction); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (explaining when
courts-martial, military courts, have jurisdiction).
147. Francesca Trianni & Andrew Katz, Why Westerners are Fighting for ISIS, TIME
(Sep. 5, 2014), http://time.com/3270896/isis-iraq-syria-western-fighters/.
148. See Wilson, supra note 140; supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
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and academics publicly argued on behalf of Khadr was because of his
confinement with adults and treatment as just another adult detained at
Guanta´namo Bay.149 The Military Commission at Guanta´namo did a
great disservice to Khadr because his prosecution only focused on justice
for the victims of his actions and not on justice for him as a child. If
juveniles are going to be prosecuted by military commissions, they should
receive the same protections juveniles in the federal and state court sys-
tems receive. Juveniles are treated with particular precautions in the
criminal justice system because of their age, which remains a concern
whether they are tried in domestic courts or military courts.
If the teenagers who have fled the country to join ISIS are tried in
domestic courts, the concern over their treatment as juveniles is not as
grave. Just this year, a nineteen-year-old female was prosecuted in federal
court for conspiracy to support ISIS, revealing that many of these teenag-
ers may not be tried in military commissions if they are apprehended
before engaging in armed conflict.150 Despite the location of their trials,
whether they take place in domestic or military courts, those under eigh-
teen prosecuted for crimes related to terrorism should receive special
protections.
In 2000, Amnesty International released a report concerning the prose-
cution and treatment of child soldiers. “Amnesty International calls for
all those who commit serious crimes such as genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and war crimes, to be held accountable for their actions.”151 The
report recognized that some children commit these crimes voluntarily and
international law does not bar their prosecution.152 The report lists the
following safeguards, as well as others, in the criminal prosecution of
child soldiers153:
1. “The right to be heard: a defendant should participate in criminal
proceedings with a full understanding of the process.”
2. “Deprivation of liberty should be used as a last resort.”
3. “The right to legal advice and care according to their age.”
4. “The right to assistance to aid physical and psychological recovery
and social reintegration.”
5. “Fair trial guarantees appropriate to the needs of children.”
With these safeguards in mind, criminal prosecutions of voluntary child
soldiers can occur while respecting the due process rights of the child as
well as promoting rehabilitation.
149. The Omar Khadr Case, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (2007), available at http://www
.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/us0607/us0607web.pdf.
150. Michael Martinez, Ana Cabrera, & Sara Weisfeldt, Colorado woman gets 4 years
for wanting to join ISIS, CNN (Jan. 24, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/
colorado-woman-isis-sentencing/.
151. Amnesty International, Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims 3 (2000), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior50/002/2000/en/.
152. Id. at 3, 8.
153. Id. at 11–13.
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Despite these potential safeguards, Mark Drumbl has argued that even
if child soldiers can fight voluntarily, they should not be criminally prose-
cuted.154 He posits: “the prospect of criminal prosecution and punish-
ment may inhibit the child soldier from the . . . decision to exit armed
factions.” According to Drumbl, if children know they will be prosecuted,
they will have less incentive or desire to leave armed groups and stop
fighting. This particular argument is based on the larger concern of his
latest book, which focuses on how to most effectively eradicate the prob-
lem of child soldiers.
However, within the context of terrorism, the concern does not stop at
the elimination of children fighting in armed conflict. The national secur-
ity threat terrorism poses as well as the atrocities committed by terrorist
organizations create a separate concern from ending the use of child
soldiers—ending terrorism. In order to balance both of these goals, child
terrorists should be held accountable through criminal prosecution, but in
a way that not only punishes, but also rehabilitates. This type of accounta-
bility addresses both the problem of terrorism and the problem of child
soldiers by rehabilitating the youth from terrorist ideology and deterring
future youth from joining extremist groups.
VI. CONCLUSION
While child soldiers are not a new phenomenon, the brutality with
which they are recruited and the subsequent human rights discourse la-
beling these children as victims are novel.155 The issue of voluntariness is
also new as the threat of global terrorism increases, and young men and
women under the age of eighteen, such as Omar Khadr, are joining the
threat. These children are not just victims but also perpetrators of atro-
cious crimes. At the same time, these child soldiers are also victims in the
sense that they are young and therefore have limited decision-making ca-
pacities, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment into terrorist organiza-
tions. While this victim/perpetrator labeling is complicated and confuses
norms surrounding criminal prosecution, the law can respond in a way
that pursues justice without artificially considering all child soldiers to be
identical.
Holding child soldiers who voluntarily commit international crimes ac-
countable does not mean that these children should be treated just like
everyone else. Their childhoods should be taken into account and re-
flected in their punishment, a punishment that should promote rehabilita-
tion. To prosecute child terrorists as any other war criminal would be a
grave failure of the criminal justice system to pursue the goals of retribu-
tion and rehabilitation.
The consequences of non-prosecution involve more than just a lack of
justice. A lack of accountability may encourage militant leaders to use
154. See generally DRUMBL, supra note 5.
155. Que´nivet, supra note 115, at 1088–89.
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teenagers to carry out the worst offenses rather than committing the acts
themselves, as they know the atrocities could be committed with impu-
nity.156 Accountability for these child soldiers is not an inhumane thirst
for revenge; it is a demand for justice and protection for the children and
those they harm.
156. Linda Van Brakel articulated similar concerns. See Brakel, supra note 16, at 50.
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